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POLICE  BODY-WORN  CAMERA  POLICY:
BALANCING  THE  TENSION  BETWEEN  PRIVACY
AND  PUBLIC  ACCESS  IN  STATE  LAWS
Kyle J. Maury*
INTRODUCTION
“The system failed us again.”1  The sounds of gunshots and broken glass
swirled in air full of smoke and tear gas.  On November 24, 2014, the streets
of Ferguson, Missouri, erupted into “a new wave of anger” after a St. Louis
grand jury refused to indict Officer Darren Wilson, who fatally shot unarmed
teenager Michael Brown a few months prior.2
On August 9, 2014, Wilson observed Brown walking down the middle of
the street and ordered him to the sidewalk.3  Seconds later, a physical strug-
gle emerged through the open driver-side window of Wilson’s police vehi-
cle.4  Many witnesses agreed that Wilson’s firearm went off inside the vehicle,
causing Brown to flee, and Wilson to pursue on foot.5  At this critical junc-
ture—just moments before the fatal shooting—accounts drastically
diverged.6  Some witnesses recalled Brown moving toward Wilson “possibly in
a threatening manner,” while others asserted Brown “was not moving and
may even have had his hands up when he was killed.”7  The inability to recon-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; B.A. in Business
Economics and Political Science, California State University Long Beach, 2013.  I would
like to extend my deepest gratitude to my family and friends for their endless love,
patience, and support throughout my studies.  I would also like to thank the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their edits, revisions, and suggestions.  All errors are my own.
1 Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-
wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html.
2 Id.
3 Tracking the Events in the Wake of Michael Brown’s Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, http://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/09/us/10ferguson-michael-brown-shooting-grand-jury-
darren-wilson.html#/#time354_10512 (last updated Nov. 24, 2014).
4 Id.
5 Frances Robles & Michael S. Schmidt, Shooting Accounts Differ as Holder Schedules Visit
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cile these conflicting accounts is, perhaps, the dispositive reason why the
grand jury refused to indict.8
Outrage on the streets of Ferguson represented “the latest illustration of
deep divisions between minorities and police that have simmered for genera-
tions”9—the result of “a gulf of mistrust exist[ing] between local residents
and law enforcement.”10  The wake of Brown’s shooting led to calls for polic-
ing reforms.  At the forefront: the implementation of police body-worn cam-
eras,11 which the White House believes will “help strengthen accountability
and transparency” because “officers and civilians [will] both act in a more
positive manner when they’re aware that a camera is present.”12
Despite political pressures calling for cameras, and their many apparent
benefits, legal scholars and policy experts warn against rapid implementa-
tion13 occurring at law enforcement agencies around the country, because
8 See Davey & Bosman, supra note 1 (reporting that St. Louis County prosecutor Rob-
ert McCulloch chose “to present ‘absolutely everything’—rather than a witness or two to
the grand jury,” and in his press conference reporting the refusal to indict, “pointed to
inconsistent and changing statements from witnesses, including observations about the
position of Mr. Brown’s hands”).  For a list of documents used in the grand jury proceed-
ings against Officer Wilson, see Documents Released in the Ferguson Case, N.Y. TIMES, http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/25/us/evidence-released-in-michael-brown-case
.html (last updated Dec. 15, 2014).
9 Deep National Mistrust of Police by Minorities Exposed in Ferguson, Missouri, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ferguson-missouri-highlights-deep-nation
al-mistrust-of-police-by-minorities/.
10 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Statement by the President
(Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/18/statement-
president.
11 See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Police Cameras Can Shed Light, but Raise Privacy Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/technology/personaltech/
police-cameras-can-shed-light-but-raise-privacy-concerns.html (arguing—only eleven days
after the Brown shooting—that police body cameras could have provided a solution to
recapturing events of criminal activity); Michael McAuliff, Police Body Cameras Seen as a Fix
for Ferguson-Style Killings, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25, 2014, 6:34 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2014/11/25/ferguson-body-cameras_n_6221558.html (highlighting
existing use of police body cameras in Dallas and New York, in Ferguson after Brown’s
shooting, and additional support for body camera use by politicians and activist groups).
12 David Hudson, Building Trust Between Communities and Local Police, WHITE HOUSE
(Dec. 1, 2014, 8:25 PM) (citing LINDSAY MILLER ET AL., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM,
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
(2014), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p296-pub.pdf), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/blog/2014/12/01/building-trust-between-communities-and-local-police.
13 See MICHAEL D. WHITE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS:
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 35 (2014), https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/
files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf (“Simply
put, there is not enough evidence to offer a definitive recommendation regarding the
adoption of body-worn cameras by police.  Departments considering body-worn cameras
should proceed cautiously . . . .”); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras,
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 836–37 (2015) (“The question is whether broad adoption of body
cameras is—like most responses to moral panic—another hasty and disproportionate reac-
tion that misses the point of the problem, or at least not the complete solution that propo-
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many important policy questions remain unanswered.  For example, what
interactions should police record?  Who will have access to observe record-
ings?  Or disclose video recordings to the public?  And how will privacy inter-
ests be respected?14
Body camera implementation remains in its infancy stage.  As such,
there is a dearth of legal scholarship analyzing the policy considerations asso-
ciated with body cameras.  Instead of raising the issues involved and assessing
arguments for and against implementation, this Note assumes body cameras
are a force for good and are here to stay for the long haul.  Consequently, the
goal of this Note is to analyze various issues involved in administering body
cameras against a backdrop of recently enacted state legislation—focusing
specifically on the tension between protecting privacy interests while also
ensuring public access to recordings.  This Note examines these competing
values and makes limited policy judgments, and in light of these determina-
tions, outlines recent body camera legislation and assesses to what degree
current laws conform to these standards.  This Note argues state laws have
identified and sought to remedy the core issues created by body cameras;
however, only some state laws strike a proper balance between respecting
privacy interests and granting the public access to video recordings.  Thus,
many state laws continue to leave important gaps in their body camera
policies.
Part I examines various visual technologies utilized by law enforcement
and compares them to body-worn camera technology, identifying what makes
body cameras unique and worthy of careful policy considerations.  Part II
discusses the benefits and drawbacks of body cameras, in order to contextual-
ize the challenges of implementing policies.  This Part functions in two ways.
First, it assesses the benefits to understand why the technology is desired and
rapidly being adopted.  And second, it provides an overview of two major
concerns body cameras create—privacy protections, and public access—and
makes limited judgments about how policies should address these factors.
Finally, Part III outlines newly enacted state legislation governing body cam-
eras, focusing specifically on how cameras are used by law enforcement and
the scope of viewing access granted to the public.  Part III further analyzes
these statutes in light of the policy judgments made in Part II and assesses
where state laws are strong or in need of improvement.
nents suggest and the public hopes. . . . As always, the issue is more complicated and the
solution less certain than public conversation recognizes or acknowledges.”); Developments
in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1797 (2015) (“[P]roper implementation of
this new policing tool requires careful consideration of current policy proposals, rather
than the rapid, reactionary adoptions currently taking place nationwide.”).
14 See Theodore Simon, Questions, but Few Answers, Surround Police Body-Worn Cameras,
39 CHAMPION 5 (2015); see also Alexandra Mateescu et al., Police Body-Worn Cameras 8
(Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2569481 (discussing variety of important policy questions created by implementa-
tion of police body cameras).
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I. THE RISE OF POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS
Law enforcement has utilized many visual technologies over the last sev-
eral decades to effectively police and prosecute crime.15  Visual technologies
were first utilized in the form of stationary surveillance, known as closed cir-
cuit television (CCTV) cameras, to protect public and private property.16
Stationary visual technologies have expanded in recent years with the
proliferation of red light cameras to enforce traffic laws, as well as automatic
license plate reader (ALPR) cameras.17  ALPR cameras photograph license
plates, convert the photo into a digital file, transmit the file to a database,
and then run the license plate numbers against “lists of stolen automobiles,
active arrest warrants, and AMBER alerts . . . [and] compare[s] them to
known criminal databases, [to] flag suspected offenders.”18
Law enforcement has also effectuated mobile visual surveillance technol-
ogies.  In the 1960s, the Connecticut State Police became the first law
enforcement agency in the United States to attempt installing a camera
inside a patrol car.19  At that time, however, “the equipment was far too cum-
bersome to make it practical for routine use.”20  The miniaturization of tech-
nology in the 1980s, though, coincided with affordability and “catapulted
audio/visual recordings into the mainstream of policing.”21  Law enforce-
ment agencies across the country began to install and use dashboard cameras
to record driving infractions, and in many cases, field sobriety tests.22  Rap-
idly, video evidence became “the most effective method of providing the nec-
essary evidence to support a conviction.”23
In the 1990s, video evidence from dashboard cameras helped jurors
determine important factual questions, such as whether defendants con-
sented to vehicle searches, or whether traffic stops were predicated on the
basis of racial bias or prejudice.24  The advantages dashboard cameras pro-
15 Visual technologies derive their effectiveness from deterring potential crime
because “awareness of being scrutinized . . . deter[s] potential criminals for fear of appre-
hension.”  Mateescu et al., supra note 14, at 4 (citing Clive Norris, The Success of Failure:
Accounting for the Global Growth of CCTV, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUD-
IES 252 (Kirstie Ball et al. eds., 2012)).
16 Id.
17 Stephen Rushin, The Legislative Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1, 1 (2013).
18 Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 281, 285 (2011).
19 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLIC-





24 See Alan C. Nash & Jason L. Scarberry, Let’s Have a Look at the Footage, OFFICER.COM
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.officer.com/article/11302594/lets-have-a-look-at-the-footage
(“In the 1990s, during America’s ‘War on Drugs,’ dash cam footage was used to show juries
that defendants had consented to the search of their vehicles during traffic stops.  The
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vided for resolving legal disputes,25 combined with the large increase in alle-
gations of racial profiling, led the Department of Justice’s Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to establish the In-Car Cam-
era Incentive Program.26  The main goal of the program was to “provide[ ]
financial aid to state police and highway patrol agencies for the sole purpose
of purchasing and installing in-car camera systems.”27
In 2002, COPS and the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP) conducted an eighteen-month nationwide study of in-car cameras,
focusing on COPS grant recipients.  The impact evaluation of the value of
cameras to police agencies supported some of the reasons for expanding
funding in the first place, such as addressing the rising number of racial pro-
filing claims.28  The data demonstrated that when officers were accused of
misconduct, and “video evidence was available, the officer was exonerated
93% of the time; in 5% of the cases the complaint was sustained.”29  The
study also concluded that dashboard cameras made incident review and pros-
ecution more efficient, reduced agency liability, enhanced officer perform-
ance and professionalism, and improved community perceptions.30  Overall,
the IACP believes “in-car camera[s] enjoy[ ] overwhelming public support
and can enhance an agency’s image while ensuring integrity and
accountability.”31
Today’s modern technological innovations have propelled mobile visual
surveillance into a new spectrum, as miniaturization and other technological
enhancements since the 2000s have given law enforcement new tools to
police and prosecute crime.32  These innovations have changed the dynamic
technology was also utilized to address sensitive issues such as racial profiling in traffic
stops and assaults on police officers.”).
25 Even the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the advantages of video evidence.
In Scott v. Harris, the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claim against a Georgia
county deputy for use of excessive force, when the deputy applied a “Precision Interven-
tion Technique” to bring the plaintiff’s fleeing vehicle to a stop.  550 U.S. 372, 375–76
(2007).  The contact between the vehicles caused wreckage, resulting in the plaintiff
becoming a quadriplegic. Id. at 375.  Relying on the videotape of the dashboard camera,
the Court noted, “it is clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and immi-
nent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian
motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase,” id. at 384, and accordingly, the Court
was “happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.” Id. at 378 n.5.
26 Lonnie J. Westphal, The In-Car Camera: Value and Impact, 71 POLICE CHIEF, no. 8,
Aug. 2004, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display
&article_id=358.  COPS helped purchase more than 5000 dashboard cameras nationwide.
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 19, at 1.
27 Westphal, supra note 26.
28 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 19, at 1.
29 Id. at 15.
30 Id. at 2.
31 Id. at 29.
32 It is worth noting that in the future, law enforcement may be able to employ drones
to provide cheap visual surveillance due to enhanced technology. See generally Jennifer
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of policing in ways CCTV, red-light, ALPR, and dashboard cameras33 have
not.  By equipping officers with “small, pager-sized cameras that clip on to an
officer’s uniform or are worn as a headset,” police can “record audio and video
of [their] interactions with the public.”34  The cameras provide “a record of
interrogations and arrests, how officers conduct themselves, and what they
witness at crime scenes.”35  It is, thus, the intimate nature of the interactions
between citizens and police that have set body cameras apart from other sur-
veillance technologies and propelled society into a new realm of modern
policing.
The first major experimentation of body cameras occurred in the
United Kingdom in late 2005 with the Plymouth Basic Command Unit
(BCU).36  Officers utilized a prototype over a weekend shift37 and saw “great
promise” in the test runs.38  This prompted the start of a pilot program to
“fully test the technology and its potential effectiveness for the Police Service
nationally.”39  The pilot program, known as the “Plymouth Head Camera
Project,” commenced in October 2006 with three hundred trained officers
and fifty head-mounted cameras,40 and lasted for seventeen months.41  Plym-
outh BCU praised the initial pilot program, noting the cameras brought ben-
efits of “deterring bad behavior and providing excellent evidence against
crooks.”42  They also observed that “rowdy youths quickly calmed when they
O’Brien, Note, Warrantless Government Drone Surveillance: A Challenge to the Fourth Amendment,
30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 155 (2013).  In fact:
The Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
aims to integrate drones into the United States national airspace by 2015.  While
the thought of prevalent private and public daily drone use might seem implausi-
ble now, the combination of this new legislation and the increasing availability of
inexpensive, technologically advanced small drones will make it a reality.
Id. at 155.
33 A dashboard camera’s “utility is limited to interactions within the camera’s view that
take place around vehicles, unlike mobile body-worn cameras, which accompany police
throughout the course of their duties.” Mateescu et al., supra note 14, at 4.
34 JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN
PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL VERSION 2.0, at 1 (2015) (emphasis added), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf.
35 Kevin Davis, Candid Cameras: After Ferguson and North Charleston, More Police to Deal
with Wearing Body Cams, 101 A.B.A. J. 15, 16 (2015).
36 MARTIN GOODALL, POLICE & CRIME STANDARDS DIRECTORATE, HOME OFFICE OF THE
U.K., GUIDANCE FOR THE POLICE USE OF BODY-WORN VIDEO DEVICES 30 (2007), http://
library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/guidance-body-worn-devices.pdf.
37 Id.
38 David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for Ensuring
Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 361 (2010).
39 GOODALL, supra note 36, at 30.
40 Id. at 6; see also WHITE, supra note 13, at 16.
41 Harris, supra note 38.
42 Britain Straps Video Cameras to Police Helmets, NBC NEWS (July 13, 2007), http://www
.nbcnews.com/id/19750278/ns/world_news-europe/t/britain-straps-video-cameras-police-
helmets/#.Vi_o1da6_wx.
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realized they were being filmed, and those arrested for drunkenness seldom
challenged police when shown videos of their behavior.”43
The U.K. Home Office then commissioned an independent assessment
of the pilot program “to identify issues of concern and to evaluate the bene-
fits of the devices.”44  In 2007, the Home Office published its findings in
Guidance for the Police Use of Body-Worn Video Devices, and concluded that the
“use of head cameras is a positive step that will make a difference to detection
rates and crime levels for violent crime and disorder in particular.”45  Pre-
mised on these perceived benefits, the Home Office made long-term body
camera plans when it announced a “national rollout” plan for head-mounted
cameras, calling for an allocation of “$6 million to fund the devices for Brit-
ain’s 42 police forces—enough to buy more than 2,000 cameras.”46
Implementation of body cameras in the United States has lagged behind
the United Kingdom.  For instance, law enforcement agencies in Rialto, Cali-
fornia, and Mesa, Arizona, only began testing use of body cameras in 2012.47
Judicial and political pressures, however, have fueled real implementation
efforts.  In 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York ordered “a trial program requiring the use of body-worn cameras
in one precinct per borough”48 when it ruled in a § 1983 class action claim
alleging New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy violated the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments.49  The court recognized the reasons why body camera
recordings can play a vital role in resolving the constitutionality of criminal
procedures, noting:
[E]valuating a stop in hindsight is an imperfect procedure.  Because there is
no contemporaneous recording of the stop (such as could be achieved
through the use of a body-worn camera), I am relegated to finding facts
based on the often conflicting testimony of eyewitnesses.  This task is not
easy, as every witness has an interest in the outcome of the case, which may
consciously or unconsciously affect the veracity of his or her testimony.
Nonetheless, a judge is tasked with making decisions and I judged the evi-
dence of each stop to the best of my ability.50
Political pressures have been a catalyst for body camera implementa-
tion—particularly following the events in Ferguson.  After the grand jury
refused to indict Officer Wilson, the Brown family made a public declaration:
“Join with us in our campaign to ensure that every police officer working the
streets in this country wears a body camera.”51  In fact, officers in Ferguson
43 Id.
44 Harris, supra note 38, at 361.
45 GOODALL, supra note 36, at 89.
46 Britain Straps Video Cameras to Police Helmets, supra note 42.
47 See infra notes 68–85.
48 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d. 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
49 Id. at 556.
50 Id. at 562.
51 Josh Sanburn, The One Battle Michael Brown’s Family Will Win, TIME (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://time.com/3606376/police-cameras-ferguson-evidence/.
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began wearing body cameras just twenty-three days after the shooting,52 and
officers in Denver, Miami Beach, Washington, D.C., and Anaheim, followed
in subsequent weeks.53  And as of October 2016, the Albuquerque,54 Austin,
Dallas, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Orlando, Tampa, and San
Diego police departments have equipped officers with cameras, while the
Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Minneapolis, New York, and Seattle police
departments are currently running pilot programs.55
Political pressures in various localities have jump-started the federal gov-
ernment to appropriate funding for local law enforcement agencies.  In
December 2014, President Obama proposed a $263 million initiative to
“increase use of body-worn cameras, expand training for law enforcement
agencies . . . [and] add more resources for police department reform.”56
The proposal included a $75 million investment to purchase 50,000 body
cameras for local law enforcement by providing a fifty percent match to agen-
cies’ purchases of cameras and storage.57  As part of the President’s proposal,
in May 2015 the Department of Justice announced the Body-Worn Camera
Pilot Partnership Program to “respond to the immediate needs of local and
tribal law enforcement organizations,” by providing $17 million in competi-
tive grants and $3 million in training and development of evaluation tools.58
Body camera implementation is a tidal wave that cannot be stopped.
Overwhelming political and judicial support has answered the question
whether officers should (or will) be equipped with cameras.  Now, the ques-
tion is how soon can officers be equipped.  These political and judicial pres-
sures are creating urgency for local law enforcement to equip their officers.
Such pressures are simultaneously forcing state and local authorities to
implement legal regimes capable of capitalizing upon the benefits body cam-
eras bring to modern policing—but also to carefully craft policies to balance
privacy concerns with ensuring adequate public access to recordings.  As the
time has come for state and local law enforcement agencies to develop poli-
cies regulating use of body cameras, an overview of benefits and drawbacks of
52 William Cummings, Ferguson Police Begin Using Body Cameras, USA TODAY (Sept. 1,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/01/ferguson-police-camer
as/14920587/.
53 Sanburn, supra note 51.
54 Dana Liebelson & Nick Wing, Most Major Cities Still Don’t Have Body Cameras for Cops,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
police-body-cameras_55cbaac7e4b0f1cbf1e740f9.
55 Police Body-Worn Camera Policies, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, https://www.brennan
center.org/body-cam-city-map (last updated Sept. 26, 2016).
56 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: Strengthening
Community Policing (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/
12/01/fact-sheet-strengthening-community-policing.
57 Id.
58 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces $20 Million in Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program (May 1,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-20-million-funding-
support-body-worn-camera-pilot-program.
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body camera implementation provides a valuable context to understanding
how policies should be designed.
II. BENEFITS AND SHORTCOMINGS
This Part discusses the benefits and drawbacks of body camera imple-
mentation.  At first blush, body cameras appear to provide many benefits,
namely: deterring police misconduct and meritless citizen complaints,59
improving resolution of legal disputes,60 and enhancing police transparency
and accountability.61  However, implementing body cameras is not the pan-
acea for modern policing issues.62  Policy experts and legal professionals cau-
tion against rapid implementation63 primarily because many important
policy questions remain unanswered.64  For example, how will privacy inter-
ests be protected?65  And what kind of access will be available to media, mem-
bers of the public, or subjects of recordings?66  However, while “we should
not be overly optimistic, neither should video’s acknowledged limitations
warrant entirely rejecting body cameras as a useful policy choice.”67
This Note’s baseline position is that body cameras are a force for good,
and indeed, here to stay long-term.  So, the most important question is, how
should body camera policies be designed to achieve positive results?  To
answer this question, it is important to categorize and discuss the benefits
and concerns created by body cameras in order to help construct and imple-
ment a viable policy capable of achieving the body camera’s vast potential to
reinforce community trust, while also minimizing its shortcomings.
59 See infra notes 75–82.
60 Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1795 (“The hope was that video
recordings of police-civilian interactions would deter officer misconduct and eliminate the
ambiguity present in cases like Michael Brown’s, making it easier to punish officers’ use of
excessive force.” (citing McAuliff, supra note 11)).
61 Id. at 1797.
62 Wasserman, supra note 13, at 837.
63 See supra note 13.
64 See Simon, supra note 14, at 5 (discussing the variety of important policy questions
created by implementation of policy body cameras).
65 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 5–9.
66 Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1807–08 (“[P]ressing concerns
about public access remain.  Many police departments currently do not allow private indi-
viduals or the media to access footage, and the open-records laws in most states make it
possible for departments to deny access indefinitely.  While body-camera footage should
constitute a public record under disclosure laws, most states have disclosure exemptions
for records involved in a law enforcement investigation. . . . Some courts have ruled that
law enforcement video footage does not fall under the exemption for criminal investiga-
tory records; however, this type of litigation is in its early stages, and in many states the
public (including individuals featured on the tapes) may remain unable to access the foot-
age.” (footnotes omitted)).
67 Howard M. Wasserman, Epilogue: Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
845, 846 (2015).
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A. The Need for Body Cameras
1. Civilizing Interaction Between Citizens and Law Enforcement
The presence of body cameras has a “civilizing” effect on interactions
between citizens and law enforcement.68  When individuals know they “are
being recorded and that the recording may be used as evidence” it will “deter
misconduct and prompt police and the public to behave better.”69  The
results, advocates claim, are a reduction in both use-of-force by police, and
complaints filed against officers.  Recent studies in California and Arizona
support these hypotheses.
Perhaps the most well-known study of police camera impacts on behav-
ior in the United States was conducted in Rialto, California, beginning in
February 2012.70  There, researchers equipped fifty-four front-line officers
with body cameras and assigned 988 shifts over a twelve-month period.
Nearly half of these shifts utilized body cameras (labeled as experimental
shifts) and the rest did not (known as control shifts).71  Researchers studied
the impact of body cameras on use-of-force by law enforcement and citizen
complaints by comparing officers not wearing the cameras over the same
time period.72  The study defined use-of-force as “encompass[ing] physical
force that is greater than basic control” or police use of OC spray, baton,
Taser, canine bite, or firearm.73  Citizen complaints were characterized as “a
grievance for alleged misconduct or . . . poor performance.”74
The results in Rialto were very encouraging.  Use-of-force incidents
declined 62%, from sixty-seven reported incidents in 2011–2012 to only
twenty-five incidents in 2012–2013.75  Moreover, half as many use-of-force
incidents occurred when an officer was wearing a body camera than when an
officer was not equipped with a camera.76  There was also a large reduction in
citizen complaints; in fact, an 87% decline in complaints against officers—
from twenty-four complaints in 2011–2012 to only three complaints in
2012–2013.77  Researchers concluded “evidence collected in this randomized
68 See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 6; Developments in the Law—Policing, supra
note 13, at 1801.
69 Wasserman, supra note 13, at 837 (emphasis added); see also Floyd v. City of New
York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 n.66 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“If, in fact, the police do, on occasion,
use offensive language—including racial slurs—or act with more force than necessary, the
use of body-worn cameras will inevitably reduce such behavior.”).
70 Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’
Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
509, 520 (2015).
71 Id.
72 WHITE, supra note 13, at 17.
73 Ariel et al., supra note 70, at 521.
74 Id. at 522.
75 Id. at 524 tbl.3.
76 Of the twenty-five use-of-force incidents, seventeen occurred during shifts without
cameras, and only eight occurred during shifts with cameras.  See id.
77 Id. at 524.
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controlled field trial . . . suggest[s] that police body-worn-cameras reduce the
prevalence of use-of-force by the police as well as the incidence of citizens’
complaints against the police.”78
A comparable study by the Mesa Arizona Police Department reached a
similar conclusion.  Mesa police conducted a program evaluating the effects
of body-worn cameras on use-of-force incidents and citizen complaints as
well.79  The study ran from October 2012 until September 2013.80  This study
compared fifty officers wearing body cameras to fifty officers (demographi-
cally similar in age, race, and gender) who did not wear cameras.81  The
results from Mesa were substantially similar to Rialto.  Mesa observed a 75%
reduction in use-of-force incidents and a 40% decline in filed citizen com-
plaints, as compared to the previous calendar year.82
Empirical research suggests body cameras do have a civilizing effect on
relations between law enforcement and the community.  As Lieutenant Har-
old Rankin of the Mesa Police Department observed, “[a]nytime you know
you’re being recorded, it’s going to have an impact on your behavior.”83
This is true for law enforcement and citizens alike, as officers “increase[ ]
their professionalism because they [know] that everything they [say] and [do
is] being recorded,”84 and conversely, informing citizens a camera is running
is “often enough to deescalate the situation.”85
2. Improving Resolution of Legal Disputes
A video recording of encounters between citizens and law enforcement
can also help lead to quicker resolutions of legal disputes before trial and
assist factual determinations during legal proceedings.  As the adage goes, “a
picture is worth a thousand words.”  In the context of civil actions, “[c]itizens
may be less likely to file ‘frivolous’ or untruthful complaints against officers
wearing cameras because citizens know that the video evidence can instantly
refute their claims.”86  This, perhaps, explains the decline in filed citizen
complaints seen in Rialto and Mesa.87  This was precisely the situation in
78 Id. at 531.
79 LEE RANKIN, MESA POLICE DEP’T, END OF PROGRAM EVALUATION & RECOMMENDA-
TIONS: ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM 1 (2013).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 12.
82 Id.
83 MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 6.
84 Id.
85 Id.; see also Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1801 (“This civilizing
effect may also extend to (or stem from) civilians who know they are being filmed, as some
police officials believe ‘the visible presence of a camera [can] . . . compel highly agitated
people to calm down more quickly.’” (alterations in original) (quoting David O’Reilly,
Evesham Police Chief Calls Cameras a ‘Game Changer’, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 7, 2014), http://
articles.philly.com/2014-08-07/news/52519341_1_body-cameras-security-cameras-evesham-
police-chief)).
86 WHITE, supra note 13, at 24.
87 See supra subsection II.A.1.
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Albuquerque, New Mexico, where a twenty-three year-old woman was
stopped and arrested for a DWI after failing a field sobriety test.88  The video
captured the woman accusing the officer of sexual misconduct, claiming:
“[You were] inappropriately touching me while I was waiting in the car.”89
The officer informed the woman the entire incident was filmed and a full
investigation quickly cleared the officer of any wrongdoing.90
In criminal cases, a “permanent record of the events that transpired” will
resolve cases “through guilty pleas rather than criminal trials.”91  This
occurred in Taunton, Massachusetts, where a thirty-four year-old man
pleaded guilty to operating under the influence (OUI), after an officer wear-
ing a body camera recorded the man almost hitting multiple vehicles, stum-
bling out of the vehicle, and refusing to take a field sobriety test.92  Officer
Walsh who made the arrest noted, “It’s tough to prove an OUI—it’s a very
difficult thing to get a conviction on.  But they (prosecutors) had irrefutable
evidence.”93  Accordingly, body cameras have the potential to eliminate legal
disputes before they arise, which has the additional benefit of “sav[ing]
departments the significant amounts of time and money spent on lengthy
investigations and lawsuits.”94
Body camera evidence can also lead to arguably more “just” resolutions
in legal proceedings.  Many claims against law enforcement have “no wit-
nesses” and involve “the officer’s word against the citizen’s.”95  Video evi-
dence “changes this dynamic”96 by creating a “record of interrogations and
arrests, as well as what officers witness at crime scenes,”97 and can also be
utilized to ensure Fourth Amendment search and seizure compliance.98
88 Radley Balko, Body Cameras Can Vindicate Cops, Too, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/22/body-cameras-can-
vindicate-cops-too/.
89 Id. (alteration in original).
90 Id. For a video of the events, see Zach Noble, Drunk Woman Says Cop Sexually
Assaulted Her, Cop Shuts Her Down with Video Evidence, BLAZE (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www
.theblaze.com/stories/2014/10/20/drunk-woman-says-cop-sexually-assaulted-her-cop-
shuts-her-down-with-video-evidence/.
91 WHITE, supra note 13, at 24 (citing GOODALL, supra note 36).
92 Charles Winokoor, Taunton Police Chief Touts Body Cameras After OUI Guilty Plea,
TAUNTON DAILY GAZETTE (Aug. 19, 2015), http://taunton.wickedlocal.com/article/201508
18/NEWS/150816667.
93 Id.
94 MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 6.
95 WHITE, supra note 13, at 23.
96 Id.
97 MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 9; see also Developments in the Law—Policing, supra
note 13, at 1803 (“Footage from body cameras may help both prosecutors and defense
attorneys by providing “objective evidence relating to whether a confession was voluntary, a
search was consented to or justified, or a physical description matched a ‘lookout.’” (quot-
ing POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., D.C., ENHANCING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH AN EFFEC-
TIVE ON-BODY CAMERA PROGRAM FOR MPD OFFICERS 5 (2014))).
98 See generally Harris, supra note 38, at 363 (noting a body camera supporter’s
argument).
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Now, triers of fact are given higher-quality evidence through the opportunity
to observe “what happened” (at least from the officer’s point of view) and
judge the credibility of testifying witnesses.99  Appellate courts also benefit
from video evidence.100
It is important to remember, though, that video evidence is not a “magic
bullet.”101  While advocates argue body camera video “will produce objective,
unambiguous evidence revealing what happened in . . . police-citizen
encounters,”102 overreliance is worrisome.  For example, the camera may not
capture important images because of its perspective, angle, and zoom.103
Indeed, jurors may discount other forms of evidence because visual evidence
is so compelling.104  So, while video evidence is not the “be-all end-all,” it
provides triers of fact a new perspective that can—at minimum—aid their
final decisions.
3. Enhancing Transparency, Police Legitimacy
Perhaps the greatest benefit of body cameras is the ability to restore faith
and confidence in law enforcement.  After all, the impetus behind body cam-
era implementation is promoting justice or, put differently, ensuring that
questionable or wrongful use-of-force by law enforcement does not go
unpunished.105  Police legitimacy derives from two elements: law enforce-
99 See infra notes 110–13 (introducing a situation where police body camera evidence
will be used to prosecute an officer charged with murder and voluntary manslaughter dur-
ing an on-duty shooting, but where the prosecution and defense have viable arguments,
and the factfinder will be able to assess the truth by virtue of the video evidence).  The
prosecutor describes the events in the video as “the most asinine act” he has “seen a police
officer make—totally unwarranted,” though the officer’s counsel argues he “feared for his
life. . . . [because] [h]e thought he was going to be sucked under the car that was pulling
away from him.”  Dana Ford & Ed Payne, Ex-University Cop in Samuel DuBose Shooting Death
Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (July 31, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/30/us/ohio-sam-
dubose-tensing/.
100 See supra note 25 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of video recorded evidence
from a patrol car to resolve the constitutional question in Scott v. Harris).  Video evidence
would be particularly helpful in resolving sufficiency of evidence claims, or reviewing any
relevant issues under the clear error or abuse of discretion standards.
101 Wasserman, supra note 13, at 833.
102 Id. at 837.
103 Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1813.
104 Id. at 1803; see also Mateescu et al., supra note 14, at 27 (“[S]tudies have shown that
viewers tend to have an exaggerated confidence in their ability to understand visual evi-
dence.” (citing Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1754
(2014) (“There are potential dangers to this quick-witted visual intelligence, however, par-
ticularly in the realm of written law, which lacks both formal and cultural rules for mitigat-
ing these dangers.  Images ‘feel’ real—as if they are transparent windows onto reality,
rather than curated, edited, visual arguments.  As a result, ‘we tend to read images using
naı̈ve theories of realism and representation’—that is, as if they don’t require interpreta-
tion at all.”(citation omitted)))).
105 For example, the public’s reaction to the failure to indict Officer Wilson in the fatal
shooting of Michael Brown.
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ment performing its traditional role of ensuring public safety and being held
accountable for its misconduct.  A prerequisite to accountability, however, is
transparency—the public’s ability to observe policing in action.  Currently,
general police mistrust stems largely from the inability to assess exactly “what
happened” in situations where police apply force.  Body cameras change the
dynamic by serving as a watchful eye over police conduct.
Law enforcement becomes more transparent when it “open[s] itself up
to outside scrutiny”106 and enables the public to observe police in action.
Because body cameras record police interactions with the public, when the
videos are released, the public has the opportunity to observe what law
enforcement does on a day-to-day basis, how it operates, and how conflicts
are resolved.107  This provides the chance to understand and assess police
action, which “leads to public trust,” and “trust benefits the community.”108
Certainly, some police activity caught through the lens of body cameras
can lead to distrust.  This is where transparency enters and balances the equa-
tion.  When the public is able to access and observe police misconduct, it
possesses the power to use legal institutions to hold such misconduct
accountable (and in a more efficient manner too).109  This opportunity has
presented itself in the shooting of Samuel Dubose by University of Cincinnati
police officer Ray Tensing in July 2015.  Tensing fatally shot DuBose during a
routine traffic stop gone awry, leading to an indictment for murder.110  Tens-
ing was wearing a body camera at the time of the shooting111—evidence that
will assuredly be used to prosecute him.  The video evidence is crucial in this
case, as the Dubose family attorney claimed “[i]f there wasn’t a video, I do
not believe we would have had an indictment.”112  While the trial date is set
for October 25, 2016,113 the video evidence will be given to the jury to decide
if Tensing should be held lawfully accountable.
Transparency—and ultimately accountability—is contingent upon the
public having access to video records.  Placing an eye on what really happens
to the public, though, presents the issue of adequately protecting the privacy
106 WHITE, supra note 13, at 19.
107 Increasing transparency has the additional benefits of “helping to prevent problems
from arising in the first place by increasing officer professionalism, helping agencies evalu-
ate and improve officer performance, and allowing agencies to identify and correct larger
structural problems.” MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 5.
108 WHITE, supra note 13, at 19 (quoting Mark W. Clark, On-Body Video: Eye Witness or Big
Brother? POLICE MAGAZINE (July 8, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/technol-
ogy/articles/2013/07/on-body-video-eye-witness-or-big-brother.aspx).
109 See supra subsection II.A.2 (discussing the benefit of resolving legal disputes).
110 Michael Martinez, Video Shows the Encounter Between Samuel Dubose, Officer Ray Tens-
ing, CNN (July 29, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/29/us/video-sam-dubose-ray-
tensing-chronology/index.html.
111 Id.
112 Id. (statements of attorney Mark O’Mara).
113 Kevin Grasha, Tensing Trial Now Set to Begin Oct. 25, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Aug. 23,
2016), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2016/08/23/tensing-trial-now-set-begin-
oct-25/89200878/.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL111.txt unknown Seq: 15 30-NOV-16 11:15
2016] police  body-worn  camera  policy 493
of individuals captured in recordings.  Balancing these two factors remains a
major hurdle in the race to establish workable policies.
B. Cautious Optimism: Important Policy Concerns
Body cameras have the potential to improve police and citizen behavior,
reduce the number of legal disputes and aid their resolution, and improve
the relations between law enforcement and the community, thereby legiti-
mizing police action.  This Section does not seek to advance arguments
against body cameras—rather, it seeks to identify particular areas of concern
and advance arguments to augment these apparent weaknesses.  As men-
tioned previously, this Note assumes body cameras are a force for good, so
long as they are properly administered.  Accordingly, in order to make
proper policy judgments, it is necessary to identify and understand the troub-
lesome byproducts body cameras create.
This Section will focus on two major issues body cameras present:
respecting privacy and providing public access to recordings.  At the outset, it
is import to highlight the tension between these two components.  The more
access provided to the public, media, and subjects of videos, the more oppor-
tunity for intrusion into the privacy interests of those persons and places
recorded on video.114  On the other hand, policies that strongly protect pri-
vacy interests have the potential to strangle the public’s ability to hold police
accountable for misconduct.  Policymakers, thus, must strike the right bal-
ance.  Consequently, understanding the types of situations where privacy con-
cerns are greatest and identifying how to tactfully manage these
circumstances is paramount.  A corollary is being mindful of the myriad of
issues involved in providing public access; and awareness of each factor is
essential to constructing a policy that can strike an ideal balance.
1. Privacy Concerns
The ability of body cameras to record “intimate interactions” raises
important privacy concerns and thus requires carefully crafted policies to
ensure sufficient protection.  The fact is, body cameras “capture in real time
the potentially traumatic experiences of citizens who are victims of a crime,
those who are involved in medical emergencies and accidents, or those who
are being detained or arrested,”115 and “capturing that on video . . . [could
make it] a public record.”116  Accordingly, this Note argues recording poli-
114 Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1808 (“Privacy is a counterpoint
to access: increasing transparency necessarily means more people will view body-camera
footage, which will frequently feature civilians who may not want the recordings of them-
selves shared.”).
115 WHITE, supra note 13, at 27.
116 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kate Hinds, Some Police Departments
Embrace Body Cameras, WNYC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.wnyc.org/story/312260-
police-departments-and-body-cameras/).
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cies must reflect respect for privacy interests by restricting recording in situa-
tions where privacy interests are threatened most.
Policymakers have two primary mechanisms to regulate body camera use
in situations where privacy is more at stake: (1) mandating when a camera
must be turned on and off, and (2) imposing notice and consent require-
ments.  Taking these factors in turn, what should the default position of the
camera be?  Non-continuously running cameras raise issues of “edit[ing] on
the fly,” or “choos[ing] which encounters to record with limitless discre-
tion.”117  Should officers, then, record for the full duration of their shift?
Continuously running cameras would be the “ideal policy” purely from an
“accountability perspective” because it would “eliminat[e] any possibility that
an officer could evade the recording of abuses committed on duty.”118  And
there are examples of officers circumventing technology (and in some cases
deliberately trying to avoid liability).119  This Note argues that continuously
running cameras would raise a variety of other concerns, such as mass surveil-
lance, greater privacy exposure, chilling officer speech and their interper-
sonal relationships with colleagues,120 and also creating voluminous amounts
of data to store and maintain.121  Furthermore, if officers are required to
record all situations and citizens know this, “it is going to damage openness
and create barriers,”122 which will create a “potential[ly] negative impact on
community relationships”—the opposite of why cameras are being employed
117 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 2; see also Alexis Sobel Fitts, It’s Almost Impossible To Tell If
Police Camera Footage Has Been Edited, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:31 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fake-police-cam-footage_55c23782e4b0f7f0bebb2b5c
(raising the issue that video recordings can be edited after the fact to conceal police
activity).
118 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 3.
119 See Joel Rubin, LAPD Officers Tampered with In-Car Recording Equipment, Records Show,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/07/local/la-me-lapd-tam-
per-20140408 (LAPD officers removed antennas from audio recording equipment in
patrol cars, raising concerns officers were “conceal[ing] what occurred in the field”); see
also Robinson Meyer, Seen It All Before: 10 Predictions About Police Body Cameras, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/12/seen-it-all-
before-10-predictions-about-police-body-cameras/383456/ (citing research by a sociologist
who concluded at least twenty-three percent of a specific police department’s VHS archive
of dashboard camera recordings were “blank or staticky,” likely in part due to video evi-
dence rooms remaining unlocked).  In another situation, an officer was under scrutiny for
not having his camera turned on during the fatal shooting of a nineteen year-old woman,
and subsequently fired for “‘insubordination and untruthfulness’ over the uniform camera
issue after an internal probe,” though he was not fired for the shooting itself.  Joseph J.
Kolb, Albuquerque Policeman Who Shot Woman Fired Over Camera Lapse, REUTERS (Dec. 1,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-new-mexico-idUSKCN0JG04N201412
02#HPq12jCDflbWX8ar.97 (quoting Police Chief Gorden Eden).
120 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 3; see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 14
(“[R]equiring officers to record all encounters can signal a lack of trust in officers, which is
problematic for any department that wants to encourage its officers to be thoughtful and
to show initiative.”).
121 MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 17.
122 Id. at 13 (statements of Chief of Police Ken Miller of Greensboro, North Carolina).
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in the first place.123  Luckily, states with body camera legislation have heeded
these concerns, and the dominant policy approach is to pursue a non-contin-
uously running camera policy.124
In general, a non-continuously running camera policy requires officers
to activate their cameras when “responding to a call for service or at the initi-
ation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter between a
police officer and a member of the public.”125  This approach requires
policymakers to outline specifically what constitutes a “law enforcement-
related encounter[ ] [or] activit[y].”126  While a major weakness is that
officers are left with abundant discretion to decide what to record and when
to record it, disciplinary and judicial checks can be utilized to offset negative
impacts of such discretion.  For example, internal police department proce-
dures can discipline officers for noncompliance with policies.  From a judi-
cial standpoint, a court could permit evidentiary presumptions in favor of
criminal defendants when it appears exculpatory evidence was concealed in
the recording, or in favor of civil plaintiffs in police misconduct cases.127
States, through legislation or common law, could also extend the exclusion-
ary rule to preclude admissibility of evidence produced by a body camera
where an officer unlawfully tampers with the camera or conceals events from
the camera’s view.  Accordingly, the negative byproducts of discretion can be
counteracted, making non-continuously running camera policies an attrac-
tive option.
So, what are the types of situations where body cameras must adjust for
privacy concerns?  This Note argues that a body camera must account for
situations where citizens are particularly vulnerable, such as interviews with
children, victims of child or sexual abuse, victims of domestic or sexual vio-
lence, or confidential informants.  Furthermore, policies must prevent
recordings from taking place within a private residence, unless the parties
consent to recording or exigent circumstances demand it.  These choices
reflect respect for the significant fact that many interactions involve police
“seeing people on the worst day of their lives”128 and body cameras drasti-
cally increase the “potential for . . . embarrassing and titillating releases of
video.”129  Restricting recording in private residences—save for consent or
exigencies—reflects the widely accepted view that a man’s home is his castle,
and the details within are not meant for the government’s eye.130  Finally, the
desire to conceal these images from the public eye is all the more important
123 Id.
124 See infra Section III.A.
125 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
126 MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 13 (noting traffic stops, arrests, searches, interroga-
tions, and pursuits).
127 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 4–5.
128 WHITE, supra note 13, at 27 (quoting Hinds, supra note 116)
129 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 5.
130 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home . . . all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”).
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given that digitalization of media permits wide dissemination of recorded
images across the Internet, creating an essentially permanent record.
Recordings should not be barred in situations where parties are not par-
ticularly vulnerable, or where a person lacks a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy,131 such as during Terry stops,132 traffic stops, or even bystanders or
witnesses to a crime or crime scene.  The reasoning is twofold.  First, limiting
use of cameras during Terry and traffic stops would render cameras useless in
the situations where they are most needed—intimate interactions with the
public—particularly when carrying out vital policing techniques, such as a
stop and frisk.  Second, courts recognize an individual lacks a reasonable
expectation of privacy in actions they knowingly expose to the public.133
Crime victims’ family members, though, do have a strong interest in ensuring
respect for their family member’s dignity if they are killed or significantly
harmed on camera,134 and recording policies should reflect respect for these
circumstances by requiring consent before public disclosure.
Policymakers should also require officers to provide notice to citizens
when recordings are in progress.135  Notice is important to avoid community
mistrust and ensure privacy interests are respected,136 particularly because
some citizens fail to notice body-worn cameras.137  Notice provides the addi-
tional incentive for all parties in an event to act in a civilized manner, thereby
131 The Supreme Court has ruled an expectation of privacy is reasonable when, first, an
individual “exhibit[s] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, when the
“individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
132 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment is not violated when a police officer conducts a reasonable stop and search of a
suspect on the street, with “reasonableness” turning on the officer’s suspicions of criminal
activity and belief in the suspect’s dangerousness.
133 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” (first citing
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); and then citing United States v. Lee, 274
U.S. 559, 563 (1927))).
134 See Kim Bellware, Chicago Releases ‘Chilling’ Video of Cop Shooting Teen 16 Times, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/laquan-
mcdonald-video_5654e329e4b079b281897fc2 (noting the family of Laquan McDonald, an
African American teenager shot sixteen times by a Chicago police officer in 2014, did not
want the video released and urged viewers not to “resort to violence in Laquan’s name”).
135 Some states already require notice under existing laws, which require two-party con-
sent for audio and video recordings.  See MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 14.  For a list of
two-party consent states, see JONATHON HAYES & LARS ERICSON, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, A PRIMER ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 7–8 (2012),
https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf.
136 Indeed, in the context of dashboard cameras, the International Association of
Police Chiefs has concluded there is strong public support for notice, as “71% [of citizens
surveyed] suggested that they should be informed when they are being videotaped.” INT’L
ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 19, at 20.
137 MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 20.
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reducing the possibility of police force.138  The impression of a surveillance
state is also weakened through notice requirements because it will preclude
officers from surreptitiously recording citizens on the street.139  Finally, pro-
viding adequate notice is not an onerous requirement, as it can simply be
given verbally, or through visible markers, such as a pin or sticker indicating
recording is in process.140  For the same reasons notice should be required,
states should also first require consent from individuals before recording,
particularly in situations where privacy interests are most vulnerable.
Ultimately, policymakers must decide which situations garner more pro-
tection and require greater camera use restrictions.  Knowing the situations
where privacy interests are most at stake allows policymakers to carefully craft
regulations.  While there are mechanisms for ensuring privacy protections ex
ante, there are ex post mechanisms as well, such as regulating public access.
2. “Access” to Recordings
An equally important consideration is the scope of “access” to video
recordings.  As the privacy concerns illustrate, it is vital to limit the scope of
persons or organizations capable of acquiring recordings of certain situa-
tions.  However, it is equally crucial to ensure the public has the opportunity
to access videos to carry out its watchdog role and ensure accountability.
“Access” to recordings encompasses a variety of facets, including: retention,
storage, viewing, public disclosure, and redaction.  Because it is important to
understand how these various features interact, they will be given appropriate
discussion here.  However, for the purposes of later analysis, particular atten-
tion will be placed only on viewing, public disclosure, and redaction.  This
Note argues that access policies must be driven by the goal of maximizing
accountability (though not at the expense of privacy) because enhancing
community trust in law enforcement is the impetus for adopting body cam-
eras in the first place, and trust cannot exist without holding culpable actors
accountable.
The first “access” question is, what recordings should be retained?  The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues videos should automatically
be “flagged” when an incident involves “use of force,” “leads to detention or
arrest; or . . . a formal or informal complaint has been registered.”141  This
view is somewhat underinclusive though, and seemingly fails to account for
the usefulness of recordings in resolving legal disputes,142 particularly when
determining the legality of searches, whether crimes occurred and by whom,
and capturing non-force incidents that could be actionable.  Arguing for a
broader understanding, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
138 See WHITE, supra note 13, at 23.
139 For example, Maryland has already passed legislation preventing officers from inter-
cepting oral communication unless the officer is part of the oral communication. MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(11)(ii)(3) (West 2015).
140 See STANLEY, supra note 34, at 5.
141 Id. at 6.
142 See supra subsection II.A.2.
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Rights (LCCHR) asserts videos should be retained “as long as it might
become relevant to a timely-filed citizen complaint; [as well as] evidentiary
video of crimes, arrests, citations, searches, uses of force and confronta-
tions.”143  This view better accounts for the potential benefits body cameras
bring for resolving legal disputes.  Ultimately, however, the answer chosen by
any given jurisdiction must encapsulate recordings of incidents where alleged
misconduct is more likely to occur.  The LCCHR’s broader definition better
captures this purpose and should be used as a template for state legislatures.
The second “access” inquiry is, how long should recordings be stored?
First and foremost, any non-flagged recording should be discarded within a
reasonable amount of time.  The reasonable time period should reflect the
ability for citizens or law enforcement agencies to flag recordings.  The
ACLU argues retention periods “should be measured in weeks not years” and
recordings should be discarded unless they are flagged.144  Similar time peri-
ods have been adopted by at least two states.145  Shorter storage times for
non-useful recordings are preferred because they “reduce the window of
opportunity for requests for release of video footage that would serve no
legitimate purpose”146 and reduce costs created by data storage.147  Once a
recording has been “flagged” or deemed worthy of “evidentiary value,” the
retention time should be extended and deleted only “at the conclusion of . . .
[the] investigation[s], court proceeding[s], or administrative hearing[s] for
which they were used.”148
As the storage summary illustrates, the capability of flagging recordings
is imperative to ensuring transparency, because otherwise recordings with a
legitimate societal purpose may be lost forever.  While law enforcement agen-
cies should retain the authority to flag recordings for their own internal
investigations and suspicions of police misconduct, this is not enough.  Any
legitimate body camera “access” policy must provide subjects of recordings
143 Letter from Wade Henderson and Nancy Zirkin, Leadership Conference on Civil
and Human Rights, to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice 3 (Jan. 30, 2015), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2015/2015-01-30-
letter-to-task-force-on-21st-century-policing.pdf.  The Police Executive Research Forum
report takes a similar view, arguing “footage of an incident or encounter that could prove
useful for investigative purposes, such as a crime, an arrest or citation, a search, a use of
force incident, or a confrontational encounter with a member of the public,” should be
retained. MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 16.
144 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 6.
145 For example, California law creates a sixty-day storage period for non-flagged
recordings before they are destroyed, CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.18(b)(5)(A) (West 2015),
and Illinois law mandates a ninety-day minimum storage requirement, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 706/10-20(a)(7) (West 2015).
146 MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 18.
147 Id. at 17.
148 Id. This is also the policy in California and Illinois. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 832.18(b)(5)(B) (“Evidentiary data . . . should be retained for a minimum of two
years . . . .”); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 706/10-20(a)(7)(C) (“Under no circumstances shall
any recording made with an officer-worn body camera relating to a flagged encounter be
altered or destroyed prior to 2 years after the recording was flagged.”).
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the ability to flag videos and serve as a check on law enforcement discre-
tion.149  Without this structural safeguard, the public loses its vital watchdog
role and reinforces the—unfortunate—status quo era characterized by mis-
trust of police.150  However, policies should require, at minimum, that the
requestor provide background facts sufficient to indicate they were recorded,
or have intimate knowledge of the events they seek to flag.  Such a require-
ment prevents random parties from “routinely flag[ging] all recordings in
order to circumvent the retention limit[s].”151
The third major “access” issue is the ability to view recordings.  The
chance to observe a recording should not be confused with disclosure—the
act of making something known to the public—which is a separate issue.
The primary inquiry here is, who should be able to view recordings?  The
public?  Law enforcement?  Both?  This Note argues both should be permit-
ted to view recordings.  First, only individuals who can meet the requirements
of “flagging” a particular recording should be permitted to view, as “whole-
sale public access would likely prove undesirable.”152  Furthermore, the gov-
ernment should allow viewing only on the premises where the copies are
stored.  The government should not be permitted to distribute copies, in
order to protect the privacy of subjects in the recordings.153  Second, likewise
for law enforcement and in fairness to their duties, officers should be permit-
ted to observe videos before making statements on the record regarding
recorded events.  While there is salient debate on this issue,154 permitting ex
149 See STANLEY, supra note 34, at 6 (“[T]hird parties should also be able to flag an
incident if they have some basis to believe police misconduct has occurred or have reasona-
ble suspicion that the video contains evidence of a crime.”).  It is worth noting the judiciary
is not in the best position to flag recordings; rather it plays a greater role in deciding
whether recordings should be disclosed.  This reinforces the need for citizens to play a
watchdog role and retain the power to flag recordings.
150 See Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1806 (“[O]nce the locus of
control shifts to the officers, the very organization meant to be held accountable will be
able to prevent these videos from being . . . shared after the fact.”).
151 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 6.  This approach has been adopted by Georgia, South
Carolina, and Texas. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(26.2)(A)–(F) (West 2015); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(5)(a)–(f) (West 2015); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.661(a)(1)–(3) (West 2015).
152 Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1808.
153 While the government could redact portions of the video before providing copies, it
would impose a very high cost in time and money to redact and to review recordings prior
to distributing a copy.  While states could impose costs upon requestors of public informa-
tion, ultimately privacy considerations should prevail in light of ongoing investigations or
legal proceedings, which could be jeopardized or otherwise negatively impacted by release
of recordings.
154 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 29 (“According to many police executives, the
primary benefit to officer review is that it allows officers to recall events more clearly, which
helps get to the truth of what really happened.  Some police executives, on the other hand,
said that it is better for an officer’s statement to reflect what he or she perceived during the
event, rather than what the camera footage revealed.  The majority of police executives
consulted by PERF are in favor of allowing officers to review body-worn camera footage
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ante review reflects the view that “[a]n officer should be given the chance to
make a statement using all of the evidence available; otherwise, it looks
like . . . trying to catch an officer in a lie.”155  To offset an officer from tailor-
ing a statement to what they observe when reviewing the video, the factfinder
should be informed that the officer reviewed the video before his or her
official statement—thus allowing the factfinder to judge the credibility of the
officer’s testimony.
Fourth, and perhaps the most noteworthy “access” issue, is public disclo-
sure.  The biggest question governing this issue is whether video recordings
should be subject to, or exempt from, state freedom of information laws.  Put
differently, the question is, which legal regime can better balance privacy
protections with providing enough disclosure for transparency, to achieve
the goal of greater accountability and improved community trust.  The opti-
mal answer is a difficult one.  This Note argues for a presumption in favor of
privacy rights over public disclosure, unless identities are redacted or consent
is given to publicly disclose the recording.  This Note therefore favors body
camera recordings being exempt from freedom of information laws.  This
presumption in favor of privacy interests over public disclosure stems from
the notion that privacy interests cannot be recovered or repaired once
exposed, particularly given the broad dissemination capabilities of the
Internet, and the fact public disclosure will ultimately occur at the end of
investigations or judicial proceedings.  Accordingly, while this Note recog-
nizes that “broad disclosure policies can promote police agency transparency
and accountability,”156 it concludes the “significant implications for the pub-
lic’s privacy rights”157 are more compelling to protect.
One way to balance these values is to “minimize invasiveness” where pos-
sible,158 which is done first by distinguishing between flagged and non-flag-
ged recordings.  Any non-flagged recording should not be disclosed without
the consent of the subjects captured in the recording, unless the subject’s
identity is redacted.159  This reflects privacy for individuals without under-
mining the downstream goal of ensuring accountability (because presumably
an issue of misconduct would be covered by a flagged recording), while also
leaving open the option to show police practices in action.
Flagged recordings are more problematic.  These recordings “are those
for which there is the highest likelihood of misconduct, and thus the ones
where public oversight is most needed”160 and are accordingly very likely to
be the subject of legal proceedings or investigations (initiated by citizens or
law enforcement).  While the demand for public disclosure for such record-
prior to making a statement about an incident in which they were involved.  They believe
that this approach provides the best evidence of what actually took place.”).
155 Id. (comments of Chief Ron Miller of the Topeka Police Department).
156 Id. at 17.
157 Id. at 18.
158 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 7.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 8.
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ings is much higher, the need to ensure adequate due process in conjunction
with privacy interests necessitates a greater propensity to prevent disclosure
in order to avoid jeopardizing ongoing legal proceedings or investigations—
at least until those procedures are complete.  Consequently, the primary
“locus of control”161 should reside in the hands of the government.  How-
ever, states should create a legal mechanism for citizens and the press to file
an application for a court order requesting public disclosure of record-
ings.162  Body camera policies must also allow law enforcement agencies to
publicly disclose recordings (which encourages agencies to consider the
political consequences of their decisions to disclose), subject to redacting
identities of video subjects unless consent is given.163  Policies should also
create a check on law enforcement discretion by enabling the judiciary to
override an agency’s refusal to disclose recordings where the public interest
demands it,164 but recordings should be redacted where applicable when a
court order is granted.  Ultimately, though, all flagged recordings should be
publicly disclosed once when legal proceedings or police investigations con-
clude in order to make police practices fully transparent.
The final “access” issue is redaction.  Redaction requires “blurring or
blacking out of portions of video and/or distortion of audio to obscure the
identity of subjects.”165  As mentioned previously, redaction should be
required for disclosure of all non-flagged recordings, unless a subject con-
sents to their identity being known.  Flagged recordings should take an iden-
tical approach.  Because the government has the “locus of control”166 to
make final public disclosure decisions, video subjects are entitled to have
their identity redacted.  In the interest of efficiency, however, policies should
require law enforcement agencies only to make good faith efforts to identify
recorded persons and seek consent within a specific time frame.
As one legal scholar has noted, “[a]s police cameras become more perva-
sive, it becomes impossible to escape demands—from courts, litigants, juries,
citizens, the media, and civilian review boards—that cameras always will be
used, that video always will be available, and that the absence of video evi-
161 Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1806.
162 Such is the case in Nevada. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 239.011(1) (West 2015) (“If
a request for inspection, copying or copies of a public book or record open to inspection
and copying is denied, the requester may apply to the district court in the county in which
the book or record is located for an order: (a) Permitting the requester to inspect or copy
the book or record; or (b) Requiring the person who has legal custody or control of the
public book or record to provide a copy to the requester . . . .”).
163 See STANLEY, supra note 34, at 7 (stating that the ACLU takes the position that
“[p]ublic disclosure of any recording should be allowed with the consent of the subjects”
and “[i]f recordings are redacted, they should be discloseable”).
164 This has been Florida’s approach. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.071(2)(l)(4)(d) (West
2105) (requiring that a body camera recording must be disclosed by a law enforcement
agency “[p]ursuant to a court order”).  Florida also provides a list of factors courts can use
to determine whether to issue an order. See id. § 119.071(2)(l)(4)(d)(I)(A)–(H).
165 STANLEY, supra note 34, at 7.
166 Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 13, at 1806.
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dence is itself suspicious and suggestive of misconduct.”167  Policymakers
must fight the urge to give in to such demands and avoid sweeping disclo-
sures that would significantly damage privacy interests.  Instead, the govern-
ment should retain control over ultimate public disclosure to prevent
widespread dissemination of video images by members of the public and to
yield respect for ongoing legal proceedings and police investigations.
III. OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF STATE LEGISLATION
Twenty-five state legislatures have devised legislation addressing “officer
use” and/or “access” to video recordings for intrastate law enforcement agen-
cies, as of August 2016.168  This Part provides a general review of this legisla-
167 Wasserman, supra note 13, at 842 (citing MILLER ET AL., supra note 12, at 40–41).
168 Two states’ legislatures, Delaware and Louisiana, passed resolutions. See H.R. Con.
Res. 46, 148th Gen. Assem., (Del. 2015); H.R. Con. Res. 59, 2016 Leg., 42nd Reg. Sess. (La.
2016).  The remaining states have properly enacted laws. See, e.g., Arizona, An Act Estab-
lishing a Law Enforcement Officer Body Camera Study Committee, 2015 Ariz. Sess. Laws
Ch. 161 (establishing a committee to study body cameras, with a sunset provision ending
June 30, 2016); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.18 (West 2015); Colorado, An Act Con-
cerning Use of Body-Worn Cameras by Law Enforcement, and, in Connection Therewith,
Establishing a Grant Program and a Study Group to Recommend Policies on the Use of
Body-Worn Cameras, 2015 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 214 (West) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-33.5-519 (West 2015)); Connecticut, An Act Concerning Excessive Use of Force,
2016 Conn. Legis. Serv. 15-4 (West) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-6d (West
2016)); Florida, Act of April 24, 2015, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2015-41 (West) (codified at
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.071 (West 2015)); Georgia, Act of May 6, 2015, 2015 Ga. Code Ann.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 173 (West) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(26.2) (West 2015));
Illinois, An Act Concerning Criminal Law, 2015 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 99-0352 (West) (codi-
fied at 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 706/10-10 to 706/10-20 (West 2015)); Indiana, An Act to
Amend the Indiana Code Concerning State and Local Administration, 2016 Ind. Legis.
Serv. P.L. 58-2016 (West); Maryland, An Act Concerning Public Safety—Law Enforcement
Officers—Body-Worn Digital Recording Device and Electronic Control Device, 2015 Md.
Legis. Serv. 129 (West) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (West
2015)); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-511 (West 2015)); Minnesota, Act of May 22, 2016,
2016 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. S0498-4 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.8473, subd. 3
(West 2016)); Missouri, Act of July 8, 2016, S.B. 732, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2016); Nebraska, An Act Relating to Law Enforcement, L.B. 1000, 104th Leg., Second Sess.
(Neb. 2016) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1452 to -1454 (West 2016)); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 239.010 (West 2015)); New Hampshire, An Act Relative to Body-Worn
Cameras for Law Enforcement Officers, 2016 N.H. Legis. Serv. 322 (codified at N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 105-D (2016)); North Carolina, Law Enforcement Agencies—Tape and
Sound Recordings—Disposition, 2016 N.C. Legis. Serv. S.L. 2016-88; North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 44-04-18.7 (West 2015); Oklahoma, An Act Relating to the Oklahoma
Open Records Act, 2015 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 370 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,
§ 24A.8 (West 2015)); Oregon, An Act Relating to Video Cameras Worn Upon Police
Officer’s Person; Creating New Provisions; and Declaring an Emergency, 2015 Or. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 550 (H.B. 2571) (West) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.910, 136.295,
165.540, 192.501 (West 2015)); South Carolina, An Act to Amend the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 2015 S.C. Acts 71 (West) (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240 (West
2015)); Texas, An Act Relating to a Body Worn Camera Program for Certain Law Enforce-
ment Agencies in this State; Creating a Criminal Offense; Authorizing a Fee, 2015 Tex.
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tion and analyzes “officer use” and “access” policies in light of the limited
policy judgments reached in Part II.  “Officer use” policies address when and
how to use cameras, while “access” provisions govern who can access record-
ings and under what conditions.  This Note will not analyze every legislative
action, but rather discuss a number of statutes in order to sketch a landscape
of the policy structures states can and have utilized.
A. Officer Use
Nineteen state legislatures have created legislation governing “officer
use” of body cameras.169  Specifically, “officer use” policies cover the default
on/off position of the camera, under what circumstances the default on/off
position may change, procedures for changing the default position, and what
kind of notice must be given, or consent required when interviewing particu-
lar persons.
States have taken two approaches to regulating officer use.  “Guidelines”
states have prescribed, to varying degrees, specific state-wide rules and proce-
dures for law enforcement to follow while delegating authority to local agen-
cies to fill the remaining gaps.  In contrast, “Pure Delegation”170 states
have—in their entirety—delegated the authority of prescribing rules to an
executive agency or local law enforcement entity.  Some “Pure Delegation”
state legislative acts require the rule creating entity to address specific topics,
while others do not provide any topical guidance.  Where executive agencies
or other commissions issue policy guidelines or recommendations, state and
local authorities are bound by such rules.  The following subsections will
review and analyze these approaches with particular emphasis on privacy
considerations.
1. “Guidelines” States
Eight states have enacted statutes prescribing requirements regarding
use of body cameras.171  The analysis begins with Illinois’ comprehensive Law
Gen. Laws 1134 (codified at TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.651–1701.663 (West 2015));
Utah, An Act Modifying the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure to Address the Use of Body-
Worn Cameras by Law Enforcement Officers, 2016 Utah. Legis. Serv. Ch. 410 (West) (codi-
fied at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-2-302(2)(g), 77-7a-102 to -107, 77-23-210(6)(a)–(b) (West
2015)); Vermont, An Act Relating to a Model State Policy for Use of Body Cameras by Law
Enforcement Officers, 2016 Vt. Acts & Resolves 163; Washington, Law Enforcement and
Corrections Officers—Video and Sound Recordings—Disclosure, 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws
163.
169 These states include: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ore-
gon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
170 The term “Pure” is used to separate “Guidelines” states, which delegate gap filling to
other entities, from those “Pure Delegation” states that delegate rule creation entirely.
The distinction is subtle, but conceptually important to recognize.
171 These states include: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ore-
gon, Texas, and Utah.
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Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, which was enacted in 2015.172
The law delegates guideline creation authority to the Illinois Law Enforce-
ment Standards Board, but requires the Board to meet several minimum
requirements.173  For example, cameras “must be turned on at all times
when the officer is in uniform and is responding to calls for service or
engaged in any law enforcement-related encounter or activity.”174  Law
enforcement encounters or activities include, among others, “traffic . . .
[and] pedestrian stops, arrests, searches, interrogations, [and] investiga-
tions.”175  The Illinois law also provides privacy protections by mandating
officers to deactivate cameras in particular circumstances (barring impracti-
cality or impossibility), such as when interviewing a “victim of a crime,” “a
witness of a crime or a community member who wishes to report a crime,” or
“a confidential informant,” and that person requests that the camera be
turned off.176  Further, the law also requires officers to “provide notice of
recording to any person if the person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy” and to demonstrate proof that notice was given in the recording.177
Finally, the Illinois law creates a system of internal checks on law enforce-
ment discretion to record by imposing discipline only where: “(A) a formal
or informal complaint of misconduct has been made; (B) a use of force inci-
dent has occurred; . . . or as corroboration of other evidence of
misconduct.”178
Illinois’ body camera law provides robust privacy protection by explicitly
requiring officers to give notice when individuals have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, thereby extending privacy protections to the home.  The law
further protects privacy interests by requiring officers to deactivate cameras
when dealing with victims of crimes, witnesses, and confidential informants.
While the law does not explicitly include children, the broad use of “victims”
and “witnesses” should cover situations where officers interview children.  A
large gap, though, is the lack of a consent requirement when interviewing
persons.  Not only does Illinois not require notice in these situations (barring
a reasonable expectation of privacy), but Illinois law places the onus on the
interviewee to end the recording—instead of first acquiring the interviewee’s
explicit consent—and further, the law does not require officers to inform
such witnesses of their right to end the recording.179
In sum, the Illinois law should also be commended for three key fea-
tures.  First, the flexibility it gives officers when complying with the law would
172 Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, 2015 Ill. Pub. Act. 99-0352 (codi-
fied as amended at 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 706/10 (West 2015)).





178 Id. 706/10-20(a)(9)(A)–(B), (D).
179 Perhaps this policy judgment reflects a greater desire for further factfinding than
the position taken by this Note, while still permitting an individual to invoke their rights.
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be “impractical or impossible” or where exigent circumstances exist.  Second,
for the internal checks it creates by subjecting officers to discipline only in
limited circumstances to deter inappropriate use of cameras.  And finally, the
recognition of varying circumstances where privacy concerns are greater.
Overall, while the law properly acknowledges situations where privacy inter-
ests should be respected most and prescribes requirements to protect those
interests, the law could impose a consent requirement for recording to fur-
ther augment its privacy protections.
The state of New Hampshire also provides a comprehensive “officer use”
statutory scheme.  In New Hampshire, officers are required to activate their
cameras at the occurrence of a law enforcement-related encounter or activity,
which is defined by statute as including, but not limited to, “traffic stops,
pedestrian stops, arrests, searches, interrogations, investigations, pursuits,
crowd control, traffic control, non-community caretaking interactions with
an individual while on patrol, or any other instance in which the officer is
enforcing the laws.”180  The law, however, grants a right not to be recorded
without consent to crime victims,181 persons anonymously reporting
crimes,182 or “where an individual has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy”183 (thereby accounting for recordings in private residences).  The stat-
ute also accounts for recording interviews with juveniles, and victims of
sexual abuse or domestic violence, by subjecting recordings to already
existing attorney general protocols for handling those situations.184  The law
goes further to protect confidential informants185 and private officer com-
munications186 from recordings.  Finally and importantly, the statute
imposes an across-the-board notice requirement to subjects of recordings by
mandating that officers “inform an individual that he or she is being
recorded as soon as practicable,”187 thus filling any privacy protection gaps in
the statute.
The most notable features of New Hampshire’s law are the mechanisms
for ensuring transparency and statutory compliance.  First, the law requires
that cameras “remain activated until the event is completed in order to
ensure the integrity of the recording”188 and “[i]f an officer fails to activate
the [body-worn camera], fails to record the entire contact, interrupts the
recording, or if the [body-worn camera] malfunctions” the officer is required
to “document why a recording was not made, was interrupted, or was termi-
180 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-D:1(VI) (West 2016).
181 Id. § 105-D:2(VII)(d).
182 Id. § 105-D:2(VII)(e).
183 Id. § 105-D:2(IX).
184 Id. § 105-D:2(VII)(d).
185 Id. § 105-D:2(VII)(b).
186 Id. § 105-D:2(VII)(g).
187 See id. § 105-D:2(VIII).  When officers fail to notify citizens of recordings, “the
recording officer shall note the reason for non-notification within the associated report.”
Id.
188 Id. § 105-D:2(X).
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nated as part of the associated police report.”189  The law also allows agencies
to “limit or restrict an officer from viewing the video file” “[i]f an officer is
suspected of wrongdoing or involved in an officer-involved shooting or other
use of deadly force.”190  These provisions are not without bite, however.  The
statute penalizes noncompliance by demanding that “[a]ny recording under-
taken in violation of this chapter or any other applicable law shall be immedi-
ately destroyed.”191  Furthermore, recordings taken in violation of the statute
are “not . . . admissible as evidence in any criminal or civil legal or adminis-
trative proceeding, except in a proceeding against an officer for violating the
[statute].”192
Like the Illinois statute, New Hampshire’s comprehensive state-wide
officer-use policy targets and accounts for situations where privacy interests
are most at stake.  The New Hampshire law goes further than Illinois,
though, by imposing a requirement to notify citizens of recordings “as soon
as practicable,”193 coupled with a citizen right not to be recorded if they are a
crime victim or they are reporting a crime.  Finally and notably, New Hamp-
shire bolsters the viability of its law with mechanisms for ensuring accounta-
bility by punishing noncompliance.
2. “Pure Delegation” States
These twelve states194 have taken action by completely delegating the
creation of officer-use policies to executive agencies, new commissions, or
local law enforcement agencies.  Some state legislatures have required the
delegated entity to address specific use-related topics,195 while Arizona, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, and North Carolina have delegated without guidance.  Until
these states announce their guidelines, however, it is impossible to determine
the extent to which they balance privacy and access.  The purpose here is
only to highlight delegation as an available policy option for state
legislatures.
B. Access
Eighteen states have enacted legislation specifically governing public
access to body camera recordings.196  Access policies address who may view
or disclose video recordings and what requirements are necessary to do so.
189 Id. § 105-D:2(XI).
190 Id. § 105-D:2(XIV).
191 Id. § 105-D:2(XVIII).
192 Id.
193 Id. § 105-D:2(VIII).
194 These states include: Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washington.
195 These states include: Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, South
Carolina, Vermont, and Washington.
196 These states include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
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States have taken two approaches to access policies.  “Exemption” states, by
default, exempt body camera recordings from state public records laws.
These states delineate specific situations where access will be provided, or
where exceptions to the default exemption exist.  “Public Record” states
make body camera recordings public records by default, and in some cases
provide exceptions for when access will be restricted.  The following subsec-
tions will discuss and highlight these approaches with an eye toward balanc-
ing respect for privacy with sufficient access, to achieve desired transparency.
1. “Exemption” States
Thirteen states have taken action to exempt body camera recordings
from state public records laws.197  South Carolina,198 for starters, provides a
variety of disclosure mechanisms.  The law permits various law enforcement
agencies, the state Law Enforcement Division, attorney general, or a circuit
solicitor to release recorded data in its discretion.199  Certain members of the
public are permitted to acquire copies of recordings if they are a subject of
camera footage, a criminal defendant, civil litigant, owner of seized or dam-
aged property captured in the recording, a legal guardian of a video subject
or criminal defendant, or an attorney for any of the aforementioned.200
Because South Carolina has deferred its “use” policies and some “access”
policies to the Law Enforcement Training Council (LETC),201 determining
which recordings will be flagged and who has the authority to flag them is
unclear.  What is clear, however, is the law currently permits executive agen-
cies to publicly disclose recordings, but lacks a judicial or citizen initiated
mechanism for public disclosure.  The addition of either mechanism would
enhance the state’s transparency.  Furthermore, the law is completely silent
on the issue of redaction where recordings will be disclosed to the public.
This is unsettling because copies can be disclosed to qualifying subjects of
recordings, who then may disclose recordings to the media.  South Carolina’s
law is strong in access because it permits disclosure by executive actions and
to subjects of recordings; however, the current lack of redaction policies
(prior to the LETC’s guidelines) is a glaring privacy weakness.
Illinois exempts recordings from the state freedom of information law
(FOIA), but has created a multi-layered structure for access to recordings,
which adjusts for varying levels of privacy interests.202  In general, any record-
ing “flagged” because a complaint was filed, a firearm discharged, the police
used force, or the event recorded resulted in arrest, detention, death, or bod-
197 These states comprise of: Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and
Washington.
198 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(1) (West 2015).
199 Id. § 23-1-240(G)(3).
200 Id. § 23-1-240(G)(5)(a)–(f).
201 Id. § 23-1-240(C).
202 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 706/10-20(b) (West 2015).
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ily harm, is subject to disclosure under the Illinois FOIA.203  The statute
imposes additional requirements, though, based on the privacy concern at
issue.  When a subject (victim or witness) of a flagged recording has a reason-
able expectation of privacy, the recording will be disclosed when the subject
gives “written permission” to the law enforcement agency.204  That said, sub-
jects lose a reasonable expectation of privacy if they are arrested during the
encounter.205  On the other hand, when there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy, a flagged recording is disclosed in accordance with FOIA,206 and
to the subject of the recording upon request.207  The Illinois statute goes
further to ensure privacy protections by redacting identities of persons who
are not subjects, officers, or otherwise “directly involved in the encounter,”
from all recordings subject to FOIA.208  In sum, the Illinois statute creates
transparency by disclosing recordings where complaints are filed, force is
used, or firearms are discharged—the exact situations where transparency is
most needed.
Florida provides another variation on public access.  Florida creates a
quasi-categorical exemption from public disclosure laws, where a recording
takes place within an individual’s private residence, healthcare and social ser-
vices facilities, or where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.209
Notwithstanding this exemption, the law allows law enforcement agencies to
disclose such recordings in the “furtherance of [their] official duties and
responsibilities.”210  Interestingly, the law requires disclosure to individuals
recorded, their personal representative, or an individual who lawfully resides,
dwells, or lodges in a place where the recording takes place—to the extent
these individuals or their property is recorded by law enforcement.211
Finally, Florida law also permits disclosure pursuant to a court order,212 and
provides courts a list of factors to assess in determining whether to issue the
order.213
Florida takes a balanced approach to providing access.  It provides the
executive and judicial branches the ability to publicly disclose recordings—
very worthwhile provisions—but it fails to promulgate redaction require-
ments or procedures.  In fact, the law only makes one reference to redaction
for public disclosure, noting that from a court order standpoint, the court
takes into account whether the “recording could be redacted to protect pri-







209 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.071(2)(l)(2)(a)–(c) (West 2015).
210 Id. § 119.071(2)(l)(3)(a).
211 Id. § 119.071(2)(l)(4)(a)–(c).
212 Id. § 119.071(2)(l)(4)(d).
213 Id. § 119.071(2)(l)(4)(d)(I)(A)–(H).
214 Id. § 119.071(2)(l)(4)(d)(I)(G).
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mitting citizens and media to file applications requesting for court-ordered
disclosure of recordings.  While the law is weak on redaction policies, it is
strong on enabling subjects to view recordings by mandating disclosure to
parties captured in recordings to the extent they are recorded.  This does not
create public disclosure problems because these parties consent to full disclo-
sure if they take recordings to the media.  This does, however, have the per-
verse potential effect of impacting ongoing court proceedings or police
investigations.  In sum, Florida is strong in providing disclosure in proper
circumstances and to proper parties, all the while balancing privacy interests,
but it could enhance privacy protection with more specific redaction policies.
2. “Public Record” States
Five states have enacted legislation subjecting recordings to state public
access laws, by default.  Nevada and California215 provide few privacy protec-
tions by making all recordings public records of the state, while Indiana,
Oklahoma, and Texas impose limitations for members of the public seeking
access.
Nevada designates body camera recordings made by peace officers216
and Nevada Highway Patrol217 as public records subject to the state’s public
records laws.  Both statutes permit disclosure only on a “per incident basis”
and limit inspection to the location where the record is held, if confidential
information cannot be redacted.218  There does not appear to be an exemp-
tion for judicial proceedings or police investigations in Nevada’s public
records laws.219  Moreover, Nevada public records laws permit distribution of
public records to members upon request.220  Nevada does account for redac-
tion of confidential information prior to distribution, though under a sepa-
rate provision from the body camera statute, which remains silent on
redaction.221
Nevada’s public records laws live up their purpose of “foster[ing] demo-
cratic principles”222 and providing liberal, sweeping access to body camera
215 Analysis of California’s public records statute will not occur here because it is sub-
stantially similar to Nevada law. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.18(d) (West 2015) (“Nothing
in this section shall be interpreted to limit the public’s right to access recorded data under
the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Divi-
sion 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code).”).  For California’s entire body camera statute,
see id. § 832.18.
216 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 289.830(2) (West 2015).
217 Id. § 480.365(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2017).
218 See id. §§ 289.830(2)(a)–(b), 480.365(2)(a)–(b).
219 See id. §§ 239.001–239.330 (defining Nevada’s public records laws); see also id.
§ 239.0105 (outlining “[c]onfidentiality of certain records of local governmental entities”).
220 Id. § 239.010(4) (effective July 2, 2017).
221 See id. § 239.010(3) (establishing that the government may not deny a request for a
public record “if the governmental entity can redact, delete, conceal or separate the confi-
dential information from the information included in the public book or record that is not
otherwise confidential”).
222 Id. § 239.001(1).
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recordings.  Given Nevada’s presumption of “constru[ing] liberally” provi-
sions of its information laws to fulfill its democratic purpose,223 the lack of
disclosure exceptions for law enforcement investigations and judicial pro-
ceedings is discouraging, and suggests the law is geared more toward trans-
parency and less toward ensuring privacy protections.
On the other hand, Oklahoma has subjected body camera recordings to
its public records law, while providing numerous exceptions to ensure pri-
vacy protections where they are needed most.224  The 2015 Oklahoma law
amended the Oklahoma Open Records Act to encompass video recordings
from police body cameras.225  The law subjects a wide range of incidents to
public records laws, including recordings of: “use of any physical force or
violence by a law enforcement officer,” pursuits, traffic stops, persons being
arrested or cited, and detentions for investigative purposes.226  The law coun-
teracts the breadth of its public access, however, by allowing the state to
“redact or obscure specific portions of the recording” in a variety of different
circumstances.227  These situations include, among others, the death of a
person not caused by law enforcement, identifying minors under sixteen
years of age, identifying victims of sex crimes or domestic abuse, witnesses
providing information to law enforcement, confidential informants, informa-
tion that would “materially” compromise an ongoing law enforcement inves-
tigation, and identities of officers subject to internal investigation.228
Notably, the statute does not redact or obscure identities in a video depicting
the death of a person, acts of severe violence, and depictions of great bodily
injury if law enforcement officers effectuate such events.229
Oklahoma’s body camera law strikes a balance between disclosure and
ensuring privacy.  Oklahoma emphasizes public access in a wide range of
incidents where complaints against officers and use-of-force are likely to
occur, while providing redaction in instances where subjects are most vulner-
able—such as victims, witnesses, and children—and also allows an exception
for “ongoing criminal investigation[s] or . . . criminal prosecution[s].”230
While situations of death and severe violence are not redacted, disclosure
indicates an emphasis on transparency where it is needed most.  Victims have
an interest in privacy in these situations, so an additional provision requiring
consent to disclosure could enhance Oklahoma’s law without significantly
hindering transparency.  This combination demonstrates a strong balance
223 Id. § 239.001(2).
224 See An Act Relating to the Oklahoma Open Records Act, 2015 Okla. Sess. Laws 4–13
(codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.8 (West)).
225 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.8(10)(a).
226 Id. § 24A.8(10)(a)(1)–(4), (6).  For the remaining situations, see id.
§ 24A.8(10)(a)(5), (7)–(10).
227 Id. § 24A.8(10)(b).
228 Id. § 24A.8(10)(b)(1), (3), (8)–(10), (12)–(13).
229 Id. § 24A.8(10)(b)(1), (4)–(5).
230 Id. § 24A.8(10)(b)(12).
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between transparency where it is likely needed and privacy protections where
they matter most.
The Nevada and Oklahoma statutes demonstrate that subjecting body
camera recordings to public disclosure laws can have two drastically different
impacts on privacy rights—with Oklahoma providing greater privacy protec-
tions than Nevada.  Accordingly, this Note argues the decision to subject
recordings to state freedom of information laws does not determine whether
privacy is adequately protected.  Rather, the aforementioned analysis demon-
strates states can implement a variety of structural mechanisms, by way of
exemptions to public disclosure, strict redacting policies, or even judicial
orders, to properly walk the line between public access and privacy interests.
CONCLUSION
Body camera technology has propelled society into a new realm of mod-
ern policing.  The capacity to record intimate interactions between citizens
and law enforcement has vast potential to remedy the broken trust that
defines this current relationship.  With this great potential to heal, however,
come several side effects; and the great rehabilitative possibilities can only be
realized if the negative effects are managed carefully.  This means states must
fashion body camera laws in a manner that properly balances privacy inter-
ests and access to recordings.
State laws must respect the privacy of individuals when they are most
vulnerable by mandating officers provide notice and then acquire consent
before recording—otherwise the camera should be deactivated altogether.
These situations include interviewing victims or witnesses of crimes, confi-
dential informants, and recordings inside private residences.  However,
where intimate privacy interests are not at risk, such as during pedestrian
stops, traffic stops, or arrests—the very situations most likely to lead to law
enforcement use-of-force—recordings should continue to roll in order to civ-
ilize police and citizen interactions and also create an evidentiary record nec-
essary to exonerate proper police conduct and punish unlawful use-of-force.
Once recordings are created, states must develop a public access infrastruc-
ture that balances the privacy interests of individuals captured in footage with
the public’s interest in observing police practices.  This requires first empow-
ering state actors and citizens alike to “flag” recordings for alleged miscon-
duct.  It then requires restricting video observation only to parties affected by
the events in recordings and law enforcement.  Finally, accountability is only
achieved through transparency of police practices.  Recordings must be pub-
licly disclosed at the conclusion of police investigations and judicial proceed-
ings, or when law enforcement and subjects in recordings consent to
disclosure.  Identities of individuals must also be redacted upon disclosure,
unless consent is given.
Through recent legislation, states have created a variety of legal regimes
regulating the use of cameras and access to their recordings.  Within the
parameters of policy judgments advanced by this Note, state legislation has
produced mixed results.  While many states have specifically accounted for
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privacy interests where recording subjects are vulnerable, some have failed in
this regard.  Further, almost across the board, states are deficient in mandat-
ing notice and consent requirements for interviews.  On the access side,
states are weak in prescribing redaction policies, but strong in enabling law
enforcement to publicly disclose recordings and allowing subjects of record-
ings to access footage.
As a cohesive whole, states have managed to identify and address the
privacy and access concerns this Note has highlighted.  However, individual
states continue to have gaps in policy, with some larger than others.  Ulti-
mately, body camera implementation is still in its infancy and states have to
start somewhere.  Justice Brandeis once wrote that one of the great features
of federalism is that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”231  This idea permeates through the wide
range of policy structures states have created.  There is strong optimism in
that states have identified and sought to remedy the most pressing concerns
body cameras create.  Through the passage of time and experimentation, the
optimal balance of privacy protections and public access is likely to be
achieved.
231 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
